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Abstract
We propose a framework which extends Antitonic Logic Programs [Damásio and Pereira, in: Proc.
6th Int. Conf. on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Springer, 2001, p. 748] to an
arbitrary complete bilattice of truth-values, where belief and doubt are explicitly represented. In-
spired by Ginsberg and Fitting’s bilattice approaches, this framework allows a precise definition of
important operators found in logic programming, such as explicit and default negation. In particular,
it leads to a natural semantical integration of explicit and default negation through the Coherence
Principle [Pereira and Alferes, in: European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1992, p. 102], ac-
cording to which explicit negation entails default negation. We then define Coherent Answer Sets,
and the Paraconsistent Well-founded Model semantics, generalizing many paraconsistent semantics
for logic programs. In particular, Paraconsistent Well-Founded Semantics with eXplicit negation
(WFSXp) [Alferes et al., J. Automated Reas. 14 (1) (1995) 93–147; Damásio, PhD thesis, 1996].
The framework is an extension of Antitonic Logic Programs for most cases, and is general enough
to capture Probabilistic Deductive Databases, Possibilistic Logic Programming, Hybrid Probabilistic
Logic Programs, and Fuzzy Logic Programming. Thus, we have a powerful mathematical formal-
ism for dealing simultaneously with default, paraconsistency, and uncertainty reasoning. Results are
provided about how our semantical framework deals with inconsistent information and with its prop-
agation by the rules of the program.
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1. Introduction
The development of efficient tools to solve problems in knowledge representation urges
a careful balance between their computational performance in carrying out some specific
inference task and the attempt to find a precise formalization of the problem.
In virtue of their mathematical power, bilattices are strong enough to provide a uniform
treatment of existing procedural systems, whilst keeping attractive computational proper-
ties. Introduced by Ginsberg [5], they have been used in the effort to implement knowledge
representation tools. Furthermore, using bilattices in logic programming formalisms, Fit-
ting attested (see [6–8]) that they are particularly adequate to represent knowledge in
situations where we can find uncertainty, incompleteness, and inconsistency. The use of bi-
lattices for supporting paraconsistent reasoning in logic programming has been supported
by others, namely [9,10].
Fitting’s results appeared at almost the same time as a diversity of frameworks for ma-
nipulating data and knowledge were proposed in the form of extensions to logic program-
ming and deductive databases [8,11–14]. Usually, the authors characterize their programs
with a model theoretical semantics, where a minimum model is guaranteed to exist, and a
corresponding monotonic fixed point operator too (whether continuous or not).
The underlying uncertainty formalism in the proposed logic programming frameworks
includes probability theory [15,16], fuzzy set theory [17,18], many-valued logic [7,14,19],
and possibilistic logic [11]. Different ways of dealing with uncertainty may be required for
any given application [20]. All such logic programming based frameworks are monotonic,
and so none allows default negation.
Following an algebraic approach to both the language and the semantics of logic pro-
grams, Damásio and Pereira define in [21] a rather general framework of Monotonic
Logic Programs, where the rules are constituted by arbitrary isotonic body functions and
by propositional symbols in the head. These programs extend definite logic program-
ming (i.e. those without non-monotonic default negation) to arbitrary complete lattices
of truth-values, via an appropriate notion of implication. It is shown that Monotonic Logic
Programs are general enough to capture several distinct logic programming semantics such
as the uncertainty formalisms above. In [1], the same authors generalize the framework to
cater for rules with arbitrary antitonic bodies over general complete lattices, and show all
standard logic programming theoretical results carry over to such Antitonic Logic Pro-
grams, defining them for Stable [22,23] and Well-founded Model [24] semantics alike.
Notwithstanding, a specific treatment for explicit negation in Antitonic Logic Programs
is not provided. In the present work we extend the previous framework to an arbitrary
complete bilattice of truth-values with appropriate negation and conflation operators. The
resultant framework is hereby dubbed Paraconsistent Logic Programs. In its presentation
we are motivated by Ginsberg’s bilattices [5], and by Lakshmanan and Sadri’s work on
probabilistic deductive databases [15]. Ginsberg’s bilattices support an elegant framework
for logic programming involving belief and doubt [7]. In particular, they lead to a precise
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acterize default negation, and ensure obedience to the coherence principle, to the effect that
explicit negation entails default negation (i.e. whatever is explicitly false must necessarily
be false by default as well). In [15], the authors argue about the convenience of explic-
itly representing both belief and doubt when dealing with incomplete knowledge, where
diverse evidence may contradict one another.
Considering that various degrees of contradictory information can be found in Paracon-
sistent Logic Programs, besides satisfying the coherence principle, a semantics for these
programs must be able to deal with both contradiction and uncertain information. More-
over, it is important not just to reason paraconsistently when facing an inconsistency, but
also to keep track of which part of the knowledge base is itself inconsistent, which part
merely depends on the inconsistent part and, of course, to detect too which part is in-
consistency free. In order to define a semantics with these requirements, we generalize
the paraconsistent well-founded semantics for extended logic programs WFSXp [3,4]. As
we do not impose any specific characterization of explicit negation, we can introduce in
our framework any negation operator supported by Ginsberg’s bilattice. In the sequel, we
present as well a semantics based on Coherent Answer Sets.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present bilattices [5,7], and empower
the framework to characterize the default negation operator. Sections 3 and 4 present the
core of our work: there we introduce respectively syntax and semantics of Paraconsistent
Logic Programs. In Section 5, we produce an illustrative example where the framework is
utilized to encode a rather complex decision table. In the subsequent section, we demon-
strate results concerning how to identify inconsistent propositional symbols or which
depend on the inconsistency of other propositional symbols. Finally, we draw out con-
clusions, refer related work, and mention future developments. An extended version of this
paper with the full proofs of all results is available at [25].
2. Bilattices
With the aim of characterizing uncertainty, several varieties of fixed point semantics
for logic programming have been proposed. In common they require a suitable machinery
ensuring the existence of fixed points of the particular operator associated with a program.
For the machinery to work smoothly there must be an appropriate interaction between
the logical operations allowed in the programming language and the underlying partial
order of truth-values. It is claimed by Fitting [7] that the notion of bilattice, as presented by
Ginsberg [5], can be applied to most kinds of fixed point semantics, providing an account of
the intended partial order for each of the truth-functional connectives and their interactions.
By employing bilattices, we avail ourselves of a powerful tool to uniformly describe
these truth-values, which can not only depict classical bivalued systems, but basically also
any multivalued approach whose underlying truth-values have some intuitive character. As
a matter of fact, in its most general presentation, bilattices can furthermore describe many
non-intuitive truth-values [5].
Definition 1 (Bilattice). A bilattice is a structure B = 〈B,t ,k〉 where B is a nonempty
set, and 〈B,k〉 and 〈B,t 〉 are both bounded lattices, i.e. with a bottom and a top element.
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respond to k , and ⊗t and ⊕t for those that correspond to t .
The partial order k is intended to represent the knowledge or information order, and
t , the truth order. In other words, we can say the knowledge order reports on how much
information we have about a particular statement p, while the truth order reports on how
confident we are in that p is true or otherwise false. Interpreting x t y, we simply thereby
mean y is truer than x; in turn, we interpret x k y as meaning the evidence underlying x
is subsumed by the evidence underlying y.
The bilattice B will be (infinitary) k-distributive if the lattice 〈B,k〉 is (infinitary)
distributive; it will be (infinitary) t-distributive if 〈B,t 〉 is (infinitary) distributive; we
will say B is cross distributive if each of ⊗t and ⊕t distributes with respect to both ⊗k
and ⊕k . If B is k-distributive, t-distributive and cross distributive, we will simply say it
is distributive. If both 〈B,k〉 and 〈B,t 〉 are complete lattices, i.e. their respective least
upper bound and greatest lower bound exist for arbitrary subsets of the lattice (not only for
finite subsets), we say that the bilattice is complete.
We may sometimes refer to a bilattice as B(C,D) whenever we wish to emphasize its
domain is the Cartesian product C × D, where 〈C,1〉 and 〈D,2〉 give us the structure
of complete lattices, and for any 〈c1, d1〉 and 〈c2, d2〉 elements of C ×D:
• 〈c1, d1〉k 〈c2, d2〉 iff c1 1 c2 and d1 2 d2,
• 〈c1, d1〉t 〈c2, d2〉 iff c1 1 c2 and d2 2 d1.
We shall use ⊥1 and 1 in order to denote, respectively, the bottom and top elements of
〈C,1〉; similarly ⊥2 and 2 will denote, respectively, the bottom and top elements of
〈D,2〉. When 1 and 2 are the same, we simply designate these elements by ⊥ and .
In a bilattice B(C,C) with 1 = 2, 〈⊥,⊥〉 and 〈,〉 are respectively the bottom and
top elements of the bilattice with respect to k ; likewise, 〈⊥,〉 and 〈,⊥〉 are respec-
tively the bottom and top elements of the bilattice with respect to t .
We can imagine the pair 〈c, d〉 in B(C,D) represents two independent judgements con-
cerning the truth of some statement: c represents our degree of evidence for the statement;
d represents our degree of evidence against it. Since C and D can be the domain of dif-
ferent lattices, expressions of belief in and against need not be measured in the same way.
In this sense, by 〈c1, d1〉 k 〈c2, d2〉 we mean 〈c2, d2〉 embodies more “knowledge” than
〈c1, d1〉, which is reflected by an increased degree of both belief in and against. On other
hand, by 〈c1, d1〉t 〈c2, d2〉 we mean 〈c2, d2〉 embodies more “truth” than 〈c1, d1〉, which
is reflected in an increased degree of evidence for, and a decreased degree of evidence
against it.
The simplest example of a non-trivial bilattice can be obtained by resorting to the lattice
constituted by the set {0,1} with 0 1 representing, respectively, the classical truth values
true and false. The bilattice B({0,1}, {0,1}), depicted in Fig. 1, gives us an isomorphic
copy of the well-known four-logic, due to Belnap [26], where 〈0,0〉 indicates we have no
evidence either for or against, and 〈1,1〉 indicates we are in an inconsistent situation of
having full evidence both for and against. Likewise, 〈0,1〉 stands for false and 〈1,0〉 for
true.
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Analyzing the bilattice B({0,1}, {0,1}) in terms of k , we can conclude that 〈0,0〉
and 〈1,1〉 are respectively the least and the greatest element, and 〈0,1〉 and 〈1,0〉 are
incomparable. Considering the relation t , 〈0,1〉 and 〈1,0〉 are respectively the least and
the greatest element, and 〈0,0〉 and 〈1,1〉 are incomparable.
Another well-known example is based on the real unit interval [0,1]. Taking C and D
as [0,1], we can think of a member of the resulting bilattice B([0,1], [0,1]) as expressing
a degree of evidence for and against. For more expressive useful bilattices, the reader is
invited to take a look in [5–7,27].
Observe the only difference between our bilattice definition and Ginsberg’s is that, like
Fitting [7], we do not consider negation as granted. Thus we may have bilattices without
a negation operator. In order to introduce it, Ginsberg [5] requires that negation mesh well
with the partial orders and satisfy the double negation property:
Definition 2 (Negation). A bilattice B = 〈B,t ,k〉 has a negation operation if there is a
mapping ¬ :B → B such that:
(1) a k b ⇒ ¬a k ¬b;
(2) a t b ⇒ ¬bt ¬a;
(3) ¬¬a = a.
Due to the way negation is contemplated in a bilattice, we can argue this operator es-
tablishes a connection between the knowledge and truth orders in a reasonable way: one
expects negation to invert the notion of truth, whilst negation would preserve the knowl-
edge order, that is, one would know as much about ¬p as one would know about p.
Suppose we have combined two identical lattices C = 〈C,〉 in order to create a bilat-
tice B(C,C). A reasonable candidate then for the negation operator is ¬〈a, b〉 = 〈b, a〉.
Intuitively, in a bilattice B(C,C), we are assuming evidence for and against are measured
in the same way. It being so, in passing from 〈a, b〉 to ¬〈b, a〉, we are just counting now
“for” what was counted “against” before, and conversely.
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reversing evidence for and against. This is equivalent to “flipping” the diagram left to right
by interchanging 〈0,1〉 and 〈1,0〉 while keeping fixed 〈0,0〉 and 〈1,1〉.
Fitting [7] introduced one more basic operator in bilattices: conflation (see [7] for de-
tails). This operator is defined in the same manner as negation, but with the roles ofk and
t interchanged:
Definition 3 (Conflation). A bilattice B = 〈B,t ,k〉 enjoys a conflation operation if
there is a mapping − :B → B such that:
(1) a k b ⇒ −bk −a;
(2) a t b ⇒ −a t −b;
(3) −−a = a.
If ¬¬a = a (respectively −−a = a) is not verified, the negation (respectively confla-
tion) operator is said to be weak. In [7], Fitting further states the conflation operator results
in moving to “default” evidence. This signifies that given L ∈ B , where B = 〈B,t ,k〉
is a bilattice with a conflation operator, in −L we are to count now as “for” whatever did
not count as “against” before, and “against” what did not count as “for”.
Then suppose again we combine two identical lattices C = 〈C,〉 in order to create a
bilattice B(C,C); if C has an order reversing involution (we denote the involute of x by
−x), a reasonable candidate for the conflation operator is −〈a, b〉 = 〈−b,−a〉 [27]. The
operator – is called a de Morgan complement. Recalling the bilattice B({0,1}, {0,1}), we
can introduce conflation by defining an operation which “flips” the bilattice in Fig. 1 from
top to bottom, interchanging 〈0,0〉 and 〈1,1〉 while keeping fixed 〈0,1〉 and 〈1,0〉.
Under these circumstances, the notion of conflation is used by Fitting [7] to define
important relations over the bilattice:
Definition 4. In a bilattice B = 〈B,t ,k〉 with conflation, for L ∈ B
1. L is exact if L = −L;
2. L is consistent if Lk −L.
Additionally, we will say L is inconsistent if L k −L.
Regarding bilattices of the kind B(C,D), we can think of the evidence for −L as the
complement of the evidence against L. Then we can say L is exact whenever evidence for
and against complement each other in some reasonable sense. If L is exact or the evidence
for (respectively evidence against) L has less knowledge than the complement of evidence
against (respectively evidence for) L, we have that L is consistent. Otherwise, if there is
a conflict of knowledge between evidence for and evidence against, i.e. the evidence for
(respectively evidence against) L has more knowledge than the complement of evidence
against (respectively evidence for) L, we have that L is inconsistent.
In the bilattice B([0,1], [0,1]), for instance, we can define conflation as follows:
−〈a, b〉 = 〈1 − b,1 − a〉. Considering this case, an element 〈α,β〉 which belongs to
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Assuming the existence of conflation, associated to each negation operator we can
define a default operator. In the same way, conflation represents a movement to default
evidence, such a default operator, denoted by notL, would represent a move to default
negation evidence. This means that given L ∈ B , where B = 〈B,t ,k〉 is a bilattice with
conflation and negation operators, in notL we are to count as “for” whatever did not count
as “for” before, and “against” what did not count before as “against”.
Assuming bilattice B with both ¬ and −, we say ¬ and − commute if ¬−A = −¬A
for all A. Taking such considerations into account we may generalize this notion of default
negation as follows:
Definition 5 (Default negation). Let B = 〈B,t ,k〉 be a bilattice. Consider that ¬ and −,
respectively, a negation and a conflation operator, that commute in B. We define not :B →
B as the default negation operator where
notL =def −¬L.
In the bilattice B({0,1}, {0,1}) (the crisp case), we can introduce default negation by
defining an operation which “flips” the bilattice in Fig. 1 both top to bottom and left to
right. This is equivalent to interchanging 〈0,0〉 and 〈1,1〉 as well as 〈0,1〉 and 〈1,0〉.
As for the bilattice B([0,1], [0,1]), we can define the default negation operator easily:
not〈α,β〉 = 〈1 − α,1 − β〉. A different definition can be found in [10]. Default negation
is antitonic1 with respect to both orders, and thus preserves neither the knowledge order
nor the truth order. In addition, this definition of not can be related to that of epistemic
logic in [28], where notL is equated with B ∼ L, that is belief in ∼L where ∼ is classical
negation. There, B∼L is given the semantics that ∼ L is true in all minimal models. To see
the relationship, let L in notL above be represented by 〈α,β〉, and let the bilattice be exact,
that is −¬L = ¬L. So 〈1 − α,1 − β〉 = 〈β,α〉, i.e. α and β are the exact complements of
one another, and consequently ¬L can be interpreted as ∼L. It follows that in this case
the conflation operator coincides indeed with the belief operator B, since notL = −¬L =
−∼L = B ∼ L. Thus one may conclude that conflation, as introduced in conjunction with
not, further generalizes the notion of belief to bilatices.
The default negation operator plays a central role in our framework. In Section 3, fol-
lowing ideas expressed in [2], we will relate it to the explicit negation operator through
the coherence principle. In its original concept, the coherence principle was introduced in
Extended Logic Programs interpreted by WFSXp .
The rationale of WFSXp is to non-trivially extract the maximum number of conclusions
from contradictory information. This provides the user with the information necessary to
decide what to do, since all possible scenarios are taken into account. The user is warned
about some potential problems, and is up to him to take the right decision. In this work, we
will generalize to some extent this property involving the detection of information support
1 A function is isotonic (antitonic) iff the value of the function increases (decreases) when we increase any
argument while the remaining arguments are kept fixed.
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a recent characterization of WFSXp in terms of argumentation semantics, the reader is
referred to [29].
As we have seen, bilattices provide a truth-value mechanism suitable for uncer-
tain/inconsistent information. In Fitting’s words [6], a logic programming fixed point
semantics can be developed relative to any bilattice. That means that under the bilattice
umbrella we can develop a framework general enough to capture a huge number of ex-
tant formalisms involving uncertain and/or inconsistent reasoning. In the next sections the
presentation and motivation for this framework will be the central topic of our concern.
3. Paraconsistent Logic Programs
In the framework of Monotonic Logic Programs [21], rules are constituted by arbitrary
isotonic body functions, and by propositional symbols in the head. In [1], Damásio and
Pereira extend the syntax of Monotonic Logic Programs allowing for rules with antitonic
bodies (Antitonic Logic Programs), of which normal logic programs are a special case.
The authors also show that all the standard logic programming theoretical results carry
over to such Antitonic Logic Programs through both Stable [22,23] and Well-founded [24]
semantics alike. Because of their arbitrary monotonic and antitonic operators over a com-
plete lattice, these programs pave the way to combine and integrate into a single framework
several forms of reasoning, such as fuzzy, probabilistic, uncertain, and paraconsistent ones.
Many works (e.g., [2,23,30,31]) have argued for the convenience of introducing into
logic programming a way to distinguish what can be shown to be false from what is false
by default because it cannot be proven true. So-called Extended Logic Programs [10,23,
32,33] add explicit negation to normal programs. In [2], it is claimed that explicit negation
should entail default negation, the Coherence Principle already mentioned before. Unfor-
tunately, antitonic logic programs as they stand are not suited to characterize this principle,
as discussed below.
Following another path, Lakshmanan and Sadri [15] proposed a framework for model-
ing uncertainty, where both belief and doubt are explicitly incorporated. Motivated by these
two formalisms, that is, extended logic programs and Lakshmanan and Sadri’s framework,
we shall extend the syntax of antitonic logic programs to bodies constructed from combi-
nations of functions isotonic or antitonic in each argument over a complete bilattice, and to
more general head formulas. Then we employ the characterization of the default negation
operator presented in Section 2 to impose coherence on it.
In the remainder of this work, we assume that every bilattice is complete, admits con-
flation and negation, and that these two operators commute. For the sake of completeness,
we start by defining an algebraic characterization of the syntax of paraconsistent logic pro-
grams. The following presentation is rather standard and more detailed accounts can be
found, for instance, in [34,35]. Since the language of our programs is single sorted, we
resort to a simplified version of signature in specifying paraconsistent logic programs.
Definition 6 (PLP signature). A signature Σ is a set of pairs 〈f,n〉 such that no function
symbol f occurs in two distinct pairs and its arity or rank n is a natural number (n 0).
The set Σn denotes the set of function symbols of arity n.
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taining at least the pairs 〈¬,1〉, 〈−,1〉 and 〈⊗k,2〉.
So, paraconsistent logic programs will be built using function symbols that represent at
least the negation and conflation operators, and the meet under knowledge ordering. The
user is free to add other function symbols and constants to the language, defining a specific
PLP signature. The association of meaning to the symbols of a PLP signature is captured
by the definition of PLP algebra:
Definition 7 (PLP algebra). Given a PLP signature Σ and a bilattice B = 〈B,t ,k〉, a
PLP algebra ABΣ is a pair 〈B, i〉 where i is an interpretation function assigning functions
to functions symbols as follows:
(1) Each symbol c in Σ0 (i.e., c is a constant symbol) is interpreted as an element i(c) in
B , denoted by
•
c.





f must be either isotonic or antitonic in each argument
with respect to k .
Moreover, i(¬) and i(−) must be respectively mapped to the negation and conflation op-
erators of B, and i(⊗k) to the meet operator under knowledge ordering of B.
Note that PLP algebras are related to semantical aspects of the operators. The next step
consists in defining the alphabet of symbols of our language, given a PLP signature.
Definition 8 (PLP alphabet). Let Σ be a PLP signature and Φ =⋃i Σi (i ∈ N), the set of
function symbols in Σ . Given a set Π of propositional symbols such that Π ∩Φ = {}, the
PLP alphabet AΠΣ over Π is the disjoint union Π ∪Φ .
The formulae which appear in the body and heads of rules in paraconsistent logic pro-
grams are defined inductively as follows:
Definition 9 (PLP formulae). Let Σ be a signature and Π a set of propositional symbols.
The set of PLP formulae FORMΠΣ is the least set of strings over the corresponding PLP
alphabet AΠΣ such that
• Every propositional symbol in Π is a formula in FORMΠΣ ;• Every constant symbol c ∈ Σ0 is a formula in FORMΠΣ ;• If F1, . . . ,Fn (n  1) are formulae in FORMΠΣ and f is a n-ary function symbol
(f ∈ Σn), then f F1 . . . Fn is a formula in FORMΠΣ .
In order to avoid unnecessary notational overhead, in this definition we specify formulae
in prefix notation. It can be shown that the set of formulae FORMΠΣ is freely generated
from the propositional and constant symbols, and the operations corresponding to function
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order logic terms in prefix notation, with the predefined unary functions symbols ¬ and
−, and the meet operator symbol ⊗k . A complete formal analysis and justification of the
above definitions can be found for instance in [34].
Before introducing the syntax of paraconsistent logic programs we require the notion
of reverse functions. A major motivation for this definition is the use of negation operators
in the head of rules. As we shall see, the bodies of our rules can be arbitrary formulae but
we have to limit the allowed functions in the heads in order to guarantee the existence of a
single model for every program under our Paraconsistent Well-Founded Semantics. As we
shall see, the notion of reverse function allows moving functions in the head to the body.
Definition 10 (Reverse functions). Given an isotonic unary function f :B → B and a par-
tial order , we say f has a reverse function with respect to  iff there is an isotonic
function f :B → B with respect to , defined as follows: for all b ∈ B , f (b) = a, where
a is the minimum element according to  such that b f (a), formally:
f (b) = min{a | b f (a)}.
It is obvious that if f exists it will be unique. The pair (f, f ) is a Galois connection in
the sense of [36], then it follows that f (b) a iff b f (a).
Proposition 11. Let ¬ be the negation operator of a bilattice. The reverse function of ¬
with respect to the knowledge ordering is ¬ itself.
As examples of operators with reverse functions we will only consider negation in the
bilattice. However, with a view towards generality, we foresee from the start the possibility
of introducing other operators with this property, for instance special instances of weak
negations. The full syntax of Paraconsistent Logic Programs can now be proffered:
Definition 12 (Paraconsistent Logic Programs). Let Σ be a PLP signature, B = 〈B,t ,
k〉 a bilattice and ABΣ a PLP algebra. A paraconsistent logic program P over the set of
propositional symbols Π is a set of rules of the form Φ[A] ← Ψ where Φ[A] and Ψ are
formulas in FORMΠΣ , such that:
(1) The head Φ[A] has the form o1 o2 . . . on A (n 0), i.e. a possible empty sequence of
unary function symbols applied to propositional symbol A.
(2) Each oi occurring in Φ[A] is an isotonic unary operator symbol in Σ1 for which there
is a qi ∈ Σ1 such that •qi is a reverse function of •oi with respect to k in B.
(3) The body Ψ is an arbitrary formula of FORMΠΣ .
If Φ[A] = o1 o2 . . . on A occurs in the head of a rule and F is an arbitrary formula of
FORMΠΣ , we denote by Φ[F ] the formula qn . . . q2 q1 F , obtained by concatenating
qn . . . q2 q1 with F . Mark that if Φ[A] = A then Φ[F ] = F .
Throughout this work, we reserve the symbol R to denote the PLP algebra below:
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Σ = {〈¬,1〉, 〈−,1〉〈⊗k,2〉}∪ {〈〈a, b〉,0〉 | a, b ∈ [0,1]},
where the required function symbols of a PLP signature are extended with constants rep-
resenting all the elements in the set [0,1]2. Notice that in the above expression 〈a, b〉 is
interpreted as a single constant symbol with no internal structure. Instead, we could have
used something like nαβ , but that would compromise readability of the examples.
Consider the bilattice B([0,1], [0,1]) constructed from the Cartesian product of the unit
interval [0,1] with itself, and the usual total ordering among real numbers.
The PLP algebra R is the pair 〈[0,1]2, i〉 constructed from B([0,1], [0,1]) such that
(1) i(〈a, b〉) = 〈a, b〉, i.e. all the constant symbols are mapped to the corresponding ele-
ments in [0,1]2.
(2) i(¬) : [0,1]2 → [0,1]2 such that i(¬)(〈α,β〉) = 〈β,α〉.
(3) i(−) : [0,1]2 → [0,1]2 such that i(−)(〈α,β〉) = 〈1 − β,1 − α〉.
(4) i(⊗k) : [0,1]2 × [0,1]2 → [0,1]2 such that i(⊗k)(〈α,β〉, 〈γ, δ〉) = 〈min(α, γ ),
min(β, δ)〉, where the function min : [0,1]× [0,1] → [0,1] returns the minimum of its
arguments.
Considering the knowledge ordering in B([0,1], [0,1]), the function i(¬) is isotonic,
and i(⊗k) is isotonic in both arguments whilst i(−) is antitonic. Recall that we can use the
alternative notations
•¬, •−, and •⊗k for denoting i(¬), i(−), and i(⊗k), respectively.
Assuming the set of propositional symbols Π contains {a, b, c, d, e}, a syntactically
correct paraconsistent logic program is:
c ← ⊗k ⊗k ⊗k a ¬b a−¬b ¬a ← 〈0.8,0.6〉 e ← −¬d
b ← ⊗k ¬¬a 〈0.9,1.0〉 d ← −〈1.0,0.0〉 e ← ¬d
In order to improve readability, we shall serve our programs with rule bodies represented
in infix notation, where the operator ⊗k associates to the left, and the negation and con-
flation operators have higher priority than ⊗k . With these usual conventions, all examples
presented in this paper are unambiguously translated to prefix notation as required by our
formal definitions. Thus, the above program may be exhibited as follows:
c ← a ⊗k ¬b ⊗k a ⊗k −¬b ¬a ← 〈0.8,0.6〉 e ← −¬d
b ← ¬¬a ⊗k 〈0.9,1.0〉 d ← −〈1.0,0.0〉 e ← ¬d
The following definition is tailored with the aim of ascertaining if an occurrence of a
propositional symbol is isotonic or antitonic:
Definition 14 (Isotonic and antitonic occurrences). Consider a set of propositional symbols
Π and let Π± be the set of annotated propositional symbols Π± = {A+ | A ∈ Π} ∪ {A− |
A ∈ Π}. The functions ∓ : FORMΠΣ → FORMΠ
±
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• For a constant symbol c, (c)± = c and (c)∓ = c.
• For every function symbol f of arity (n  1) and for all formulae F1, . . . ,Fn in
FORMΠΣ , then
(f F1 . . . Fn)
± = f G1 . . . Gn and (f F1 . . . Fn)∓ = f H1 . . . Hn




f is isotonic in the




f is antitonic in the ith argument.
A propositional symbol A annotated with A+ in Ψ± is said to be an isotonic occurrence of
A in Ψ . Similarly, if A is annotated with A− in Ψ± then the occurrence is antitonic in Ψ .
It should be clear that every occurrence of a propositional symbol in Ψ appears in the
translated formula Ψ± annotated either with + or −, and thus will be either isotonic or
antitonic. The designations isotonic and antitonic occurrence will be fully understood after
defining how a formula is “evaluated” with respect to a partial interpretation. For instance,
(⊗k ⊗k ⊗k a ¬b a − ¬b)± is the formula ⊗k ⊗k ⊗k a+ ¬b+ a+ − ¬b−, as expected.
The expression Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | B1, . . . ,Bn] (m,n 0) denotes the formula Ψ , where
A1, . . . ,Am and B1, . . . ,Bn are, respectively, the isotonic and antitonic occurrences, of
propositional symbols in Ψ in the order they appear in Ψ (left to right). We usually denote
a rule Φ[A] ← Ψ of P by Φ[A] ← Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | B1, . . . ,Bn] in order to make clear
the isotonic and antitonic occurrences of propositional symbols in the body of the rule.
A paraconsistent logic program P is a monotonic logic program if all the rules are of
the form Φ[A] ← Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | ]. We refer to P as an antitonic logic program if each
rule is either of the kind Φ[A] ← Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | ] or else Φ[A] ← Ψ [ | B1, . . . ,Bn].
4. Semantics of Paraconsistent Logic Programs
Regarding the semantics, we follow a paraconsistent and paracomplete approach in-
spired by WFSXp [3,4], one of the well-founded based semantics proposed for extended
logic programs [37]. Furthermore, we introduce a Stable Model semantics too: the Coher-
ent Answer Sets. The well-founded based semantics will be defined via an alternating fixed
point definition in the style of [38], and also relates to the works in [9,27].
In order to simplify the presentation, we assume in the rest of this section the existence
of a given PLP signature Σ , a PLP algebra ABΣ for a complete bilattice B = 〈B,t ,k〉
with conflation and negation commuting in B, and a set of propositional symbols Π .
The first difficulty in defining the semantics for paraconsistent logic programs concerns
the evaluation of body formulae with antitonic occurrences of propositional symbols, in
particular for defining default negation. A simple fixed point definition of the semantics is
hampered because the bodies of rules have no more an isotonic (or monotonic) behavior
with respect to an uniform assignment of elements in the bilattice to propositional symbols
(an interpretation). A technique used in logic programming literature resorts to the notion
of partial interpretation, requiring first the usual notion of interpretation.
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of propositional symbols. An interpretation of Π is a mapping I :Π → B . The set of all
interpretations of the propositional symbols with respect to B is denoted by IB.
The pointwise ordering extends the knowledge ordering k on the truth-values in B to
the set of interpretations as follows.
Definition 16 (Lattice of interpretations). Consider IB the set of all interpretations of a set
of propositional symbols Π with respect to a complete bilattice B, and two interpretations
I1, I2 ∈ IB. Then, 〈IB,〉 is the complete lattice where I1  I2 iff ∀p∈Π I1(p)k I2(p).
The least interpretation  maps every propositional symbol to the least element under k
of B, and the greatest interpretation  maps every propositional symbol to the top element
under k of the same complete bilattice of truth-values B.
A partial interpretation is a pair of interpretations mapping propositional symbols to
elements in the underlying bilattice.
Definition 17 (Partial interpretations). A partial interpretation Ip of a set of propositional
symbols Π is a pair Ip = 〈I t , I tu〉 of interpretations of Π with respect to a complete
bilattice B. The set of all partial interpretations is IpB.
When speaking about (partial) interpretations we usually omit the set of propositional
symbols Π , which is implicitly provided. Sometimes we refer to I t as the T-component
and to the I tu as the TU-component of a partial interpretation. The T-component repre-
sents what certainly holds in the partial interpretation, while the TU-component contains
what may hold (i.e. the “complement” of what certainly does not hold). The annotations
T and T U are a remnant of the WFSXp semantics basis, since in a two-valued setting the
T-component and TU-component capture, respectively, what is “true” and what is “true or
undefined” (“non-false”). It is also important to mark that (I t  I tu) is not imposed and,
consequently, paraconsistency is allowed, i.e. something may certainly hold and not hold
(by being simultaneously “true” and not “non-false”). Two orders among partial interpre-
tations are useful:
Definition 18 (Standard and fitting orderings). Let Ip1 and Ip2 be two partial interpretations.
The standard and Fitting’s orderings among partial interpretations are defined by:
Standard ordering: Ip1 s Ip2 iff I t1  I t2 and I tu1  I tu2 .
Fitting’s ordering: Ip1 f Ip2 iff I t1  I t2 and I tu2  I tu1 .
The set of partial interpretations ordered by s or by f is a complete lattice. Clearly, the
bottom and top elements of these lattice are ⊥ps = 〈,〉 (viz. all is false), ps = 〈,〉
(viz. all is true), ⊥pf = 〈,〉 (viz. all is undefined) and pf = 〈,〉 (viz. all is true and
false).
The standard ordering prefers partial interpretations maximizing what certainly holds
and minimizing what certainly does not hold. Fitting’s ordering prefers interpretations with
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notated with +) should be evaluated in the T-component of the partial interpretation, while
the antitonic occurrences (annotated with −) should be evaluated in the TU-component,
resulting in an element of the bilattice B. This separation between isotonic and antitonic
occurrences of propositional symbols is fundamental to allow for the specification of con-
verging operators in order to obtain fixed point semantics for every paraconsistent logic
program [9,22,27,38]. A precise inductive definition of the evaluation of formula in a par-
tial interpretation can now be provided:
Definition 19 (Valuation). For a given partial interpretation Ip = 〈I t , I tu〉 define induc-
tively the function valIp : FORMΠ
±
Σ → B as follows:
• For every propositional symbol A, valIp (A+) = I t (A).
• For every propositional symbol A, valIp (A−) = I tu(A).
• For every constant symbol c, valIp (c) = •c.
• For every function symbol f of arity (n  1) and for all formulae F1, . . . ,Fn in
FORMΠ±Σ , then valIp (f F1 . . . Fn) =
•
f (valIp (F1), . . . , valIp (F1)).
The valuation function Î p : FORMΠΣ → B is defined by Î p(Ψ ) = valIp (Ψ±). If the for-
mula Ψ is of the form Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | B1, . . . ,Bn] by the expression Ψ̂ [I (A1), . . . , I (Am) |
J (B1), . . . , J (Bn)] we mean 〈̂I, J 〉(Ψ ), where 〈I, J 〉 is the partial interpretation con-
structed from the interpretations I and J .
The main property of the valuation function is captured in the following proposition,
explaining why we designated isotonic and antitonic occurrences of propositional symbols
those annotated with + and −, respectively:
Proposition 20. Consider the partial interpretations Ip and Jp with Ip f J p , then for
every formula Ψ in FORMΠΣ :
valIp (Ψ±)k valJp (Ψ±) and valIp (Ψ∓)k valJp (Ψ∓).
Therefore, Î p(Ψ )k Ĵ p(Ψ ).
An increase in the values assigned to propositional symbols in the T-component and de-
crease of the values in the TU-component of a partial interpretation maintains or increases
the value of a formula with respect to that partial interpretation. The notion of model of a
program is now straightforward:
Definition 21 (Model). A partial interpretation Ip satisfies a rule Φ[A] ← Ψ of a paracon-
sistent logic program P iff Î p(Ψ )k Î p(Φ[A]). A partial interpretation Ip is a model of
P iff Ip satisfies all rules of P .
Notice we resort to the knowledge ordering to specify the notion of model. The intent
of paraconsistent logic programs is to specify what should hold and not hold via program
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logic programming over bilattices, as argued in [10,27], since k symmetrizes evidence
for and against. The least upper bound of the knowledge ordering can be interpreted as an
“accept all” operator that combines knowledge, in order to record cases in which there is an
evidence at the same time for and against a given proposition, and pinpoint contradictory
knowledge [10].
In particular, assume we state a proposition, say a, to be both true and false, via the
rules a ← t and ¬a ← t, where the constant t is mapped to the greatest element in the
truth-ordering. Using the knowledge ordering, a is mapped to the greatest element in the
knowledge ordering, meaning that there is some sort of inconsistency in the program. Using
the truth-ordering instead, the rule ¬a ← t would be trivially satisfied, and a would be
mapped to the greatest element in the truth-ordering, therefore losing the information that
there is some sort of inconsistency in the program.
Proposition 22. A partial interpretation satisfies a rule Φ[A] ← Ψ iff satisfies the rule
A ← Φ[Ψ ].
From the previous proposition we conclude that the function symbols appearing in the
head can be “moved” to the body of the rule. Thus, function symbols in rule heads are
simply “syntactic sugar” allowing the user to more naturally express his knowledge in a
paraconsistent logic program.
The next major definition generalizes the Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation and the Γ
operator [22]. The rationale is to extract from the program all its consequences, assuming
that an interpretation is used to evaluate the antitonic occurrences of propositional symbols.
Technically, this is achieved by coupling together the ideas of Gelfond–Lifschitz division
operators [22] and of the immediate consequences operator of van Emden and Kowalski
[39], along the lines of [27].
Definition 23 (Gamma operator). Let P be a paraconsistent logic program and J a given
interpretation. The generalized immediate consequences operator TBP
J




(I )(A) = lubk
{
Φ̂[Ψ ][I (A1), . . . , I (Am) | J (B1), . . . , J (Bn)]
such that Φ[A] ← Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | B1, . . . ,Bn] ∈ P
}
.




with respect to the  ordering
between interpretations, formally:




↑λ, for some ordinal λ.
The definition of the generalized immediate consequences operator TBP
J
makes use
of Proposition 22 guaranteeing the semantic equivalence of the rules A ← Φ[Ψ ] and
Φ[A] ← Ψ . The TBP operator determines the value assigned to each propositional symbolJ
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for an interpretation of isotonic occurrences of propositional symbols and fixed interpreta-
tions of antitonic ones. The operator must be “iterated” from  in order to guarantee that
all the rules for all the propositional symbols are satisfied, for the fixed interpretation of
the antitonic occurrences of propositional symbols. This is attained by the ΓBP operator.
Notwithstanding, in conformity with [2], negation and default negation are not unre-
lated: the Coherence Principle, when adopted, ensures that the former entails the latter.
From an epistemic viewpoint, coherence can be seen as an instance of the Necessitation
Principle, which states that if something is known then it is believed, i.e. its negation is
false in all minimal models [28]. Therefore, one has Ak not ¬A (Coherence Principle).
Since not¬A =def −A (Definition 5), it suffices to guarantee Ak −A then. Technically,
we can define the coherence principle in the following manner:
Definition 24 (Coherence Principle). Let P be a paraconsistent logic program. Then a
model Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 of P complies with the Coherence Principle iff for every propo-
sitional symbol A appearing in the language of P , M̂p(A) k M̂p(−A), i.e. Mt(A) k•− Mtu(A).
Given these arguments, and in order to enforce coherence, we will resort to the semi-
normal gamma operator, inspired by the approach taken in the definition of the paracon-
sistent well-founded semantics with explicit negation WFSXp [3,4], itself inspired by the
semi-normal gamma operator of WFSX [40], which it generalizes to the paraconsistent
case. Semi-normality itself is a designation borrowed from semi-normal defaults, the rea-
son being that the semi-normal logic program rules add to the rule’s body the default literal
not¬H , where H is a propositional symbol or their explicit negation in the head. In our
context, not¬H is, by definition, −H .
Definition 25 (Semi-normal Gamma operator). Let P be a paraconsistent logic program
and J an interpretation. The semi-normal immediate consequences operator TBPs
J
:IB →
IB maps interpretations to interpretations:
TBPs
J
(I )(A) = lubk
{
Φ̂[Ψ ][I (A1), . . . , I (Am) | J (B1), . . . , J (Bn)]
•⊗k
•−J (A)
such that Φ[A] ← Ψ [A1, . . . ,Am | B1, . . . ,Bn] ∈ P
}
.




↑λ, for some ordinal λ.
Mark that coherence is enforced in every propositional symbol A by not letting the
value of the bodies for A surpass
•−J (A). Before proceeding, it is necessary to ensure that
both ΓBP (J ) and Γ
B
Ps
(J ) are well defined. This is immediate from Knaster–Tarski theorem
[41], since both versions of the immediate consequence operators are monotonic:




). Let P be a paraconsistent logic program




are monotonic with respect to the
pointwise extension  of knowledge ordering to interpretations.
The dual alternating ΓBP Γ
B
P operator suffices to define an extension of well-founded
semantics [24,38] to bilattice based logic programs, as done in [9,27]. In particular, this
technique is followed in [1] to define semantics for Antitonic Logic Programs. Since
ΓBP Γ
B
P does not take into account semi-normality, it cannot capture the Coherence Prin-
ciple. The solution is described in [3,4], in which an alternating fixed point definition of
WFSXp is provided, relying on the application of two anti-monotonic operators, ΓPΓPs .
Before generalizing this result to our framework we need to ensure the next theorem:
Theorem 27 (Anti-monotonicity). Consider a paraconsistent logic program P . Let J1 and
J2 be two interpretations such that J1  J2. Then ΓBP (J2)  ΓBP (J1) and ΓBPs (J2) 
ΓBPs (J1).
Corollary 28. Consider a paraconsistent logic program P . Let J1 and J2 be two interpre-
tations such that J1  J2. Then ΓBP ΓBPs (J1)  ΓBP ΓBPs (J2).
From the monotonicity of the ΓBP Γ
B
Ps
operators we know, again by the Knaster–Tarski
theorem [41], for any paraconsistent logic program P , that ΓBP ΓBPs has a least fixed point.
This fixed point is affirmed to define the paraconsistent well-founded semantics:
Definition 29 (Paraconsistent well-founded semantics). Let P be a paraconsistent logic
program, and Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 be a partial interpretation. We say Mp is a partial paracon-
sistent stable model of P iff Mt = ΓBP (ΓBPs (Mt)) and Mtu = ΓBPs (Mt).
The least partial paraconsistent stable model under the Fitting ordering is the paracon-
sistent well-founded model WFMp(P ), and can be obtained by iterating ΓBP ΓBPs from .
Then, given that interpretation Iw is the least fixed point of ΓBP ΓBPs under  ordering, we
shall have WFMp(P ) = 〈Iw,ΓBPs (Iw)〉.
Given that Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 is a partial paraconsistent stable model, we say a proposi-
tional symbol A is:
• fully defined with respect to Mp iff Mt(A) = Mtu(A);
• undefined with respect to Mp iff Mt(A) <k Mtu(A);
• overdefined with respect to Mp iff Mt(A) k Mtu(A).
We also say a propositional symbol A is strictly overdefined with respect to Mp iff Mtu(A)
<k M
t(A).
Alternatively, by letting ΩBP (J ) = 〈ΓBP (J tu),ΓBPs (J t )〉, an operator mapping partial
interpretations to partial interpretations, the partial paraconsistent stable models of the pro-
gram P can be seen as the fixed points of ΩB. Since ΩB is monotonic with respect to f ,P P
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once more guaranteed to exist, and can be obtained by iterating ΩBP from ⊥pf = 〈,〉.
The ΩBP operator is the counterpart of the Przymusinski operator to characterize well-
founded semantics [42].
An important result is that every partial paraconsistent stable model is indeed a model
of the program:
Theorem 30. Let P be a paraconsistent logic program. Every partial paraconsistent stable
model of P is a model of P .
When both components of the partial interpretation coincide, then an extension of an-
swer set semantics [23] is obtained:
Definition 31 (Coherent answer sets). Let P be a paraconsistent logic program. A coherent
answer set is a fully defined partial paraconsistent stable model, i.e. of the form 〈M,M〉,
where M is an interpretation.
As usual, coherent answer sets are not guaranteed to exist. However, like paraconsistent
well-founded models, coherent answer sets do comply with the Coherence Principle:
Proposition 32. Let P be a paraconsistent logic program. Then all partial paraconsis-
tent stable models Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 of P obey the Coherence Principle, i.e. M̂p(A) k
M̂p(−A) for every propositional symbol A appearing in the language of P .
The Coherence Principle is still valid for more general classes of formulae, as described
in the following corollary:
Corollary 33. Let P be a paraconsistent logic program, and Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 a partial
paraconsistent stable model. For every formula F constructed from propositional symbols,
constant symbols representing consistent values in the underlying bilattice, and combina-
tions of ⊗k and ¬ then M̂p(F )k M̂p(−F).
The corollary below is immediate, providing the confirmation that our semantics obeys
Coherence:
Corollary 34. All coherent answer sets and the paraconsistent well-founded model of a
paraconsistent logic program P observe the Coherence Principle.
Naturally, the Paraconsistent Well-founded Semantics extends Well-founded Semantics
[24], and its generalizations WFSX [2,43] and WFSXp [3,4]. Similarly, Coherent Answer
Sets extend the Answer Sets Semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [23]. For additional de-
tails, the reader is referred to [25].
In the next section we show an example motivating the applicability of our framework
and of its two proposed semantics.
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Decision table for flu
fever cough headache muscle_pain flu
no no no no no (in 99% of cases)
yes no no no no (in 80% of cases)
yes yes no no no (in 30% of cases)
yes yes no no yes (in 60% of cases)
yes yes yes yes yes (in 75% of cases)
5. Example
Paraconsistent Logic Programs have a large range of applications. We address the fol-
lowing example, adapted from [44], encoding a decision table based on rough relations.
These are determined by Rough Sets (cf. [44]), introduced to deal with imprecise infor-
mation. In [45,46], several logic programming languages are defined, making it possible
to describe systems using rough relations and reason about them. On some points, these
languages resemble our framework but they differ essentially in not enforcing coherence,
and by limiting themselves to Belnap’s four valued logic.
The symptoms fever, cough, headache, and muscle_pain are used to decide whether a
patient has a flu. The diagnosis is performed according to decision table2 of Table 1.
Mark that in the 3rd and 4th lines of Table 1 we have evidence for and against the
conclusions for the same set of symptoms, and that in 10% of those cases the physician
remains undecided.
We resort to the PLP algebra R = 〈[0,1]2, i〉 exhibited in Example 13 to encode the
decision table. The first case is directly representable in paraconsistent logic programming
by the rule:
(1)¬flu ← 〈0.99,0.0〉 ⊗k ¬fever ⊗k ¬cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain.
Similarly, the second diagnosis case could be implemented via the next rule:
(2)¬flu ← 〈0.8,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k ¬cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain.
The translation of the final case is immediate:
(3)flu ← 〈0.75,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k headache ⊗k muscle_pain.
Returning to rule (1), because of the way negation was defined (Definition 2) and since
the truth-value of the head is greater or equal to that of the body in any model, one may
alternatively construe it as:
flu ← ¬(〈0.99,0.0〉 ⊗k ¬fever ⊗k ¬cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain)
which reduces to3
(4)flu ← 〈0.0,0.99〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k headache ⊗k muscle_pain.
2 The figures are fictitious.
3 From [7], we have ¬(A⊗k B) = (¬A⊗k ¬B).
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of rule (4), with the exception of the confidence degrees in the two rules. According to
WFMp , the truth-value of flu is determined by the least upper bound (under k) of the
truth-values assigned to the bodies of the rules for flu. Consequently, rules (1) (in its form
(4)) and (3) can be combined into a single one:
(5)flu ← 〈0.75,0.99〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k headache ⊗k muscle_pain.
Thus, the above rule expresses both positive and negative evidence for diagnosing a flu:
• if a patient has fever, cough, headache, and muscle-pain, then flu is a correct diagnosis
in 75% of the cases;
• if a patient doesn’t have fever, doesn’t cough, and doesn’t have headache nor muscle-
pain either, then he doesn’t have flu in 99% of the situations.
So, the positive evidence for the consequent is only concluded when all the propositions
in the body of the rule have positive evidence for them. Symmetrically, the negative evi-
dence for the conclusion is only gotten when all propositions in the body supply negative
evidence.
For the remaining situation (fever, cough, no headache, and no muscle_pain) two dis-
tinct rules are required for concluding whether the patient might or might not have a flu (as
per cases (3) and (4)):
¬flu ← 〈0.3,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.6,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain.
So the paraconsistent logic program rules for diagnosing flu are:
¬flu ← 〈0.8,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k ¬cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.75,0.99〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k headache ⊗k muscle_pain,
¬flu ← 〈0.3,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.6,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain.
Assume now that antibiotics are prescribed when flu is not concluded. We now compare





The former concludes that antibiotics should be prescribed when there is explicit neg-
ative evidence for flu. With the latter rule, antibiotics are recommended when there is no
evidence4 for flu.
4 Which is not the same has having negative evidence!
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Models for the flu program
fever cough headache muscle_pain flu ¬flu −¬flu
T 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,0.99〉 〈0.99,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.01〉
TU 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,0.99〉 〈0.99,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.01〉
T 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,0.8〉 〈0.8,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.2〉
TU 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,0.8〉 〈0.8,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.2〉
T 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.6,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.6〉 〈0.4,0.7〉
TU 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.0,1.0〉 〈0.6,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.6〉 〈0.4,0.7〉
T 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.75,0.0〉 〈0.0,0.75〉 〈0.25,1.0〉
TU 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈1.0,0.0〉 〈0.75,0.0〉 〈0.0,0.75〉 〈0.25,1.0〉
T 〈0.4,0.6〉 〈0.7,0.3〉 〈0.1,0.9〉 〈0.2,0.7〉 〈0.4,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.4〉 〈0.6,0.7〉
TU 〈0.4,0.6〉 〈0.7,0.3〉 〈0.1,0.9〉 〈0.2,0.7〉 〈0.4,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.4〉 〈0.6,0.7〉
T 〈0.4,0.6〉 〈0.7,0.3〉 〈0.7,0.9〉 〈0.2,0.7〉 〈0.4,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.4〉 〈0.7,0.7〉
TU 〈0.4,0.6〉 〈0.7,0.3〉 〈0.1,0.3〉 〈0.2,0.7〉 〈0.3,0.3〉 〈0.3,0.3〉 〈0.6,0.7〉
We illustrate next the behavior of paraconsistent well-founded semantics in several sit-
uations. Table 2 contains six different models of the above program. The first row of every
model corresponds to the T component of the model, while the second row represents its
TU component. The five leftmost columns represent the interpretation, and the two right-
most columns the confidence degrees of explicit and default negations.
The first model in Table 2 is obtained by adding the set of facts below to the previous
rules, where the confidence degrees are extracted from the T component of the WFMp
model of the program:
fever ← 〈0.0,1.0〉 cough ← 〈0.0,1.0〉
headache ← 〈0.0,1.0〉 muscle_pain ← 〈0.0,1.0〉
The first four models correspond to the (4) previously identified cases about diagnosing
flu. As the reader can easily check, the column for flu is in accordance with the evidence
expressed in Table 1.
The distinctive effect of the rules antibiotics ← ¬flu and antibiotics ← −¬flu can be
observed in the columns for ¬flu and −¬flu. By the Coherence Principle, it is always the
case that, for every model, M̂p(¬flu)k M̂p(−¬flu), as the reader can check in the T-rows
of each model. For instance, in the second model we have ¬flu with degree of evidence
〈0.8,0.0〉 and −¬flu with evidence 〈1.0,0.2〉, and as expected 〈0.8,0.0〉 k 〈1.0,0.2〉.
Since f lu has value 〈0.0,0.8〉, and −¬flu has value 〈1.0,0.2〉, antibiotics should definitely
be prescribed according to rule (7), confirming there is no positive evidence for having a
flu. The situation where flu is diagnosed appears in the fourth model, and so antibiotics are
not then prescribed.
In the fifth model the physician is uncertain regarding each symptom. The interesting
aspect of this case is that the degree of evidence for flu is obtained by combining together
the degrees of evidence of several rules.
Finally, the last model illustrates how paraconsistency is handled by our semantics. The
fact headache ← 〈0.7,0.9〉 is inconsistent in Fitting’s sense (and thus in the WFMp). In
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which is less (in the k sense) than its degree of truth (〈0.4,0.3〉). As we shall observe in
the next section, this is indicative that flu is dependent on some inconsistent value: in our
example, on the value assigned to headache. All the other previous models are consistent
and fully-defined, i.e. they are coherent answer sets.
6. Capturing inconsistency and its dependencies
This section is devoted to the presentation of material and theorems related to inconsis-
tencies and their propagation by the rules of a paraconsistent logic program. Specifically,
we will provide a necessary and sufficient condition for inconsistency of a paraconsis-
tent logic program; a necessary condition for dependence on inconsistency of a particular
propositional symbol, and a counterexample of why this last condition is not also sufficient.
In order to motivate our results, note that in last model of Table 2, for two propositional




As we have mentioned, the T-component for headache is inconsistent in Fitting’s sense
(cf. Definition 4). The inconsistency of a propositional symbol is reflected in the para-
consistent well-founded model by forcing (via semi-normality) its TU-component to be
less than its T-component according to knowledge order. However, although the T-value
〈0.4,0.3〉 assigned to flu is not in itself inconsistent, even so, flu, with its TU-value of
〈0.3,0.3〉, preserves this apparently bizarre behavior. In the sequel, we show such situa-
tions happen just when a propositional symbol depends on some inconsistency.
Before showing these results, we adopt some conventions motivated by the example
forthwith:
Example 35. Given the PLP algebra R = 〈[0,1]2, i〉, consider the programs P1 and P2:
P1 =
{
a ← b ⊗k c,
b ← 〈0.6,0.8〉,
c ← 〈1.0,0.0〉,
P2 = a ← 〈0.6,0.8〉 ⊗k 〈1.0,0.0〉
whose respective paraconsistent well-founded models, Mp1 and M
p
2 , indicate
Mt1(a) = 〈0.6,0.0〉 and Mtu1 (a) = 〈0.4,0.0〉,
Mt2(a) = 〈0.6,0.0〉 and Mtu2 (a) = 〈0.6,0.0〉.
We can explain why Mp1 and M
p
2 disagree regarding “a” by noting that in P1 we have an
inconsistent constant being assigned to “b” through the rule b ← 〈0.6,0.8〉, whilst in P2,
we have no inconsistent value being assigned to a rule head since 〈0.6,0.8〉 •⊗k 〈1.0,0.0〉 =
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Mt1(a) also differs from M
tu
1 (a). In contrast, in P2, M
t
2(a) = Mtu2 (a).
When proving the results below, the bilattice of truth-values are supposed to be infini-
tary k-distributive. We also assume a constant γ is only allowed to appear in rules of the
form Φ[A] ← γ . It is just a semantical restriction, because from a syntactical point of
view, and without loss of generality, in a rule Φ[A] ← Ψ we can replace any constant γ
appearing in Ψ by a new propositional symbol (say c′), and add the rule c′ ← γ to P . The
purpose is to keep a tighter control on the propagation, via the program rules, of inconsis-
tency generated by constants. Acting this way, we force inconsistent constants to behave as
ordinary inconsistent propositional symbols. In the remaining part of this section, we treat
constants and propositional symbols indistinctly.
We make use of Theorem 36 to ensure that, given a paraconsistent well-founded model
Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 for a program P , Mt  Mtu is equivalent to saying every propositional
symbol in the language of P is consistent.
Theorem 36. Let Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 be the least fixed point of ΓBP ΓBPs for a paraconsistent
logic program P . Then Mt  ΓBs Mt iff for every propositional symbol A in P language,
Mt(A)k
•−Mt(A).
Obviously, as it can be checked in the example below, if Mt(A) k Mtu(A) there is
some propositional symbol B inconsistent in Mp .
Example 37. Consider the paraconsistent logic program P showed in Example 35:
¬flu ← 〈0.8,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k ¬cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.75,0.99〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k headache ⊗k muscle_pain,
¬flu ← 〈0.3,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.6,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain.
Besides these rules, P contains the set of facts:
F1 =
{ fever ← 〈0.4,0.6〉, cough ← 〈0.7,0.3〉,
headache ← 〈0.7,0.9〉, muscle_pain ← 〈0.2,0.7〉.
The WFMp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 for P corresponds to the fifth model of Table 2, where we
conclude Mtu(flu) = 〈0.3,0.3〉 <k Mt(flu) = 〈0.4,0.3〉. Accordingly, as ensured by The-
orem 36, there is some propositional symbol (in this case, headache) inconsistent in the
language of P , since 〈0.7,0.9〉 k 〈0.1,0.3〉 =
•−〈0.7,0.9〉.
Underpinned by Theorem 36, corollary below is immediate:
Corollary 38. All coherent answer sets of a Paraconsistent Logic Program are consistent.
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is itself inconsistent or A depends on some inconsistency. However, before introducing it,
let us motivate the notion of dependence:
Example 39. Let P be the program obtained by replacing the set of facts F1 in Example
37 with the set F2 below:
F2 =
{ fever ← 〈1,0〉, cough ← 〈1,0〉,
headache ← 〈0,1〉, muscle_pain ← 〈0,1〉.
The resultant WFMp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 for P corresponds to the third model of Table 2, where
we conclude Mt(flu) = Mtu(flu) = 〈0.6,0.3〉. In the program P above, we have four rules
for flu, but not all effectively contribute to the final value assigned to flu according to
WFMp . Clearly Mt(flu) and Mtu(flu) are obtained by combining the values assigned by
the bodies of the rules
¬flu ← 〈0.3,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain,
flu ← 〈0.6,0.0〉 ⊗k fever ⊗k cough ⊗k ¬headache ⊗k ¬muscle_pain
present in the program of Example 37. When calculating the paraconsistent well-founded
model for P , the values assigned by the first two rules are completely absorbed by the val-
ues assigned by the other two rules for flu mentioned in the example above. Consequently,
without affecting the final result, we can eliminate the two first rules for flu.
In the proposition below, we just define the set UA in order to gather all rules for Φ[A]
which contribute to the value established for A according to WFMp . The objective is to
guarantee that if A is consistent, and for all rules r which effectively contribute to A (r ∈
UA), if we have for all propositional symbols A′ in the body of r , Mt(A′) k Mtu(A′),
then Mt(A)k Mtu(A):
Proposition 40. Let P be a paraconsistent logic program, A a propositional symbol of its
language. Let Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 be the paraconsistent well-founded model of P , and define
BodyA =
{
M̂p(Φ[Ψ ]) | Φ[A] ← Ψ ∈ P } and
UA =
{
Φ[A] ← Ψ | M̂p(Φ[Ψ ]) is an upper bound of BodyA
}
.
If the following conditions hold:
• Mt(A)k
•−Mt(A),
• For every rule of the form Φ[A] ← γ in UA, where γ is a constant symbol, we have•
γ k
•− •γ ,
• For every rule Φ[A] ← Ψ [B1, . . . ,Bm|C1, . . . ,Cn] in UA, we have Mt(Bi) k
Mtu(Bi) and Mt(Cj )k Mtu(Cj ),
then Mt(A)k Mtu(A).
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r for A such that for at least a propositional symbol (or constant) A′ in the body of r ,
Mt(A′) k Mtu(A′). Recalling Example 37, we have
Mtu(headache) = 〈0.1,0.3〉<k Mt(headache) = 〈0.7,0.9〉,
and
Mtu(flu) = 〈0.3,0.3〉<k Mt(flu) = 〈0.4,0.3〉.
Just by taking a look at the WFMp for the program P we conclude, from Proposition 40,
that headache is inconsistent and flu depends on an inconsistency (in this case, headache).
Because of the generality of the bilattice structure, we do not have the converse result
for Proposition 40:




a ← b ⊗k d ⊗k −¬a, b ← 〈0.7,0.3〉,
c ← −¬c, d ← 〈0.8,0.3〉,
c ← e ⊗k f, e ← 〈0.7,0.6〉,
f ← 〈0.6,0.2〉, g ← 〈0.7,0.7〉,
h ← g ⊗k c, i ← a ⊗k h.
After evaluating the paraconsistent well-founded model Mp = 〈Mt,Mtu〉 for P , we obtain
Mt(i) = 〈0.3,0.2〉, Mtu(i) = 〈0.3,0.2〉,
Mt (a) = 〈0.3,0.3〉, Mtu(a) = 〈0.7,0.2〉,
Mt (h) = 〈0.6,0.2〉, Mtu(h) = 〈0.3,0.3〉.
Based on Proposition 40, both the propositional symbols “a” and “h” depended on in-
consistency. In addition, given that the only rule for “i” in P is i ← a ⊗k h, we can
undoubtedly say “i” is also dependent syntactically on an inconsistency. However, as
Mt(a)⊗k Mt (h) = Mtu(a)⊗k Mtu(h), we have Mt(i) = Mtu(i), and our clue for “i” de-
pending on an inconsistency is lost! However, we note that “i” does not in this case actually
depend on the inconsistent values for “a” and “h” to the point where these matter, for the
value of “i” could be exactly the same for non-inconsistent values of the former. The open
question is how to characterize and identify in a declarative and simple way such circum-
stances. We can still have the desired result in specific situations, when, for instance, we
assume for every propositional symbol “a” in the program’s language, Mtu(a)k Mt (a)
(a is strictly overdefined in Mp). As we can see in [47], this is enough to apply the converse
result in Extended Logic Programs.
7. Conclusions, related work, and open issues
In this work we have fine-tuned some issues and explored new ones, arising from [47]
in which we introduced Paraconsistent Logic Programs. These generalize Antitonic Logic
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cepts to cope with explicit and default negation, and certifying that the latter complies with
the Coherence Principle. Program rules are rather complex: heads are constituted by ap-
plications of unary functions to a propositional symbol admitting a reverse function with
respect to k , whilst bodies correspond to compositions of arbitrary monotonic and anti-
tonic operators, in each argument, over a complete bilattice in the sense of Ginsberg [5].
In order to define the semantics we then resort to a program division in the spirit of [22],
which transforms paraconsistent logic programs into monotonic ones. Forthwith, we can
similarly apply an immediate consequences operator, guaranteeing the existence of a min-
imum paraconsistent well-founded model WFMp .
To motivate the use of Paraconsistent Logic Programs, and in order to map decision
tables based on rough relations, we examine how our semantics manipulates inconsistency.
Establishing some new results, we show how the semantics allows for paraconsistency at
the same time it keeps, to some extent, a monitoring eye on the inconsistent information and
its propagation through the program rules. As regards a complexity analysis of the WFMp ,
at a first glance, it sounds expensive in terms of computational time, notwithstanding, for
specific instances, that we can have inference methods based on polynomial algorithms, as
in the implementation of WFSXp [4].
Indeed, in [47] we have provided a simple translation of Extended Logic Programs un-
der WFSXp into Paraconsistent Logic Programs. Furthermore, other frameworks are easily
embeddable into ours, such as Probabilistic Logic Programs [15], Possibilistic Logic Pro-
gramming [11], Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs [13], Generalized Annotated Logic
Programs [14], and Fuzzy Logic Programs [12]. On the one hand, these translations per-
mit to simultaneously deal with negation, paraconsistency, and non-monotonic reasoning,
within the uncertain formalisms above. On the other, we may now study the behavior of
WFSXp , and of other important paraconsistent semantics for Extended Logic Programs
when uncertain reasoning, otherwise absent, is introduced into them.
Like Antitonic Logic Programs, we may envisage Paraconsistent Logic Programs as a
natural extension of Fitting’s works [7,27]. Particularly, our framework enables us to make
a distinction between explicit negation and default negation, and to explore the coherence
principle. In contradistinction to Fitting, we do not restrain our framework to interlaced
bilattices. We should mention as well that the central point in these works is the logic
programming syntax, instead of considering arbitrary isotonic and antitonic functions in
the bodies. To be absolutely fair, the publication [27] introduces the notions of attenuation
operators, which can be viewed as arbitrary monotonic operators over bilattices. In other
related work [10], Arielli defines a semantics for extended logic programs also based on
bilattices, but with a restricted syntax. The author too advocates the coherence principle
in some specific situations, but it is not clear whether this is a general property of the
semantics. We intend to explore the connections to this work in the future. In a similar
direction, it is the work by Denecker et al. [9], but its focus is on the properties of the
operators to guarantee the existence of a well-founded and stable model like semantics,
while ours is in the definition of a language permitting the construction of such operators.
Moreover, we rely on the combination of two related but distinct anti-monotonic operators.
The generality of our framework propels us to many possible future avenues of research:
we may next generalize our structure to consider rules with more complex heads, for in-
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our framework, so as to improve the understanding of properties of concrete instances, and
to compare them to existing work. Focusing on more theoretical results, we have detected
promising links between our semantics and substructural logics [48,49], to be exposed in
subsequent work. Based on these results, we shall define a model theory for our seman-
tics in a style similar to that of Cabalar [50] and Pearce [51]. Given the close relationship
between our semantics and WFSXp , it is possible, by introducing a suitable operator to
capture consistency, to obtain a model theory satisfying the Gentle Principle of Explosion
[52]. Consequently, the resulting logic can be classified as a Logic of Formal Inconsistency
(LFI) [52]. Another interesting line of research is the study of the various types of negation,
specially if we allow for weak negation operators as well. This offers the opportunity for
examining how the Coherence Principle functions in such cases. The definition of tabled
derivation procedures is also envisaged, for some specific instances of the framework.
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